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Despite the wealth of studies investigating factors affecting decisions, not much is
known about the impact of stereotypical beliefs on strategic economic decision-making.
In the present study, we used the ultimatum game paradigm to investigate how
participants playing as proposer modulate their strategic economic behavior, according
to their game counterparts’ stereotypical identity (i.e., responders). The latter were
introduced to the participants using occupational role nouns stereotypically marked with
gender paired with feminine or masculine proper names (e.g., linguist-Anna; economist-
David; economist-Cristina; linguist-Leonardo). When playing with male-stereotyped
responders, proposers quickly applied the equity rule, behaving fairly, while they adopted
a strategic behavior with responders characterized by female stereotypes. They were
also longer to make their offers to female than to male responders but both kinds of
responders received comparable offers, suggesting a greater cognitive effort to treat
females as equally as males. The present study explicitly demonstrates that gender
stereotypical information affect strategic economic decision-making and highlights a
possible evolution of gender discrimination into a more insidious discrimination toward
individuals with female characteristics.
Keywords: ultimatum game, gender stereotypes, proposer, strategic decision-making
INTRODUCTION
The Proposer Playing the Ultimatum Game: Between Social
Preference and Strategy
One topic of major interest in economic decision-making studies is the strategic behavior adopted
by individuals faced with economic decisions (Camerer, 2003). The interest in how social and
emotional information aﬀects economic decision-making has steadily grown over past decades
(for overviews see Frith and Singer, 2008; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). The ultimatum game has
provided, for now many years, a fruitful paradigm for assessing the social aspects of economic
decision-making (Güth et al., 1982). In the standard version of this two-player game, a proposer
oﬀers to split a ﬁxed amount of money (e.g., 10€) with a responder. Both receive their shares only
if the responder accepts the oﬀer. Game theory predicts that in order to maximize their outcome,
proposers should behave in a rational and self-interested way, oﬀering the smallest share possible
to the responder (e.g., 1€ out of 10€; Neumann andMorgenstern, 1947). But psychological research
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on judgment and decision-making has produced a wealth of
evidence that, in practice, this theory does not provide a
satisfactory description of human behavior (e.g., Güth et al.,
1982; Camerer, 2003). Indeed, on average, proposers oﬀer about
40% of the total amount of money (e.g., 4€ out of 10€) to the
responders (for a meta-analysis see Oosterbeek et al., 2004).
Such a behavior has been under scrutiny for now decades, and
various theories have been proposed to explain the proposers’ fair
behavior.
Social norms are deﬁned as “the customary rules that govern
behavior in groups and societies.” Honesty, loyalty, reciprocity,
or promise keeping, to name a few, do guarantee smooth
interactions between individuals of a given social group or
society (Bicchieri, 2006). This common value system plays a
crucial role in individual choices because, by shaping individual
needs and preferences, these norms serve as criteria for selecting
among alternatives. People choose what they prefer, and what
they prefer conforms most of the time to social expectations
(Bicchieri, 2006). According to social preference models (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), proposers, who
embrace social norms, make almost fair oﬀers because they
have altruistic concerns toward the responders and care about
the distribution of payoﬀs among players. On the other hand,
according to other authors, the apparent fairness preference of
the proposers may in turn reﬂect strategic concerns (for an
overview see Nelissen et al., 2011). Indeed, the proposers are
aware that responders are likely to have social expectations
and thus may reject unfair oﬀers (Güth et al., 1982; Camerer,
1999, 2003; Sanfey, 2009). Consequently, because they want to
maximize their gain, the proposers have to accurately determine
the smallest amount of money the responders may accept (i.e.,
the minimum acceptable; Blount, 1995). Then, proposers may
feign altruism, oﬀering almost fair shares to the responders
(Kagel et al., 1996; Nelissen et al., 2011), aiming at lowering
the occurrence of emotionally painful rejections (Gürogˇlu et al.,
2009). The results of various studies attest that it is more likely
that proposers’ fair behavior reﬂects both altruistic and strategic
concerns (Blount, 1995), with a certain inter-variability among
individuals in the altruistic/strategic balance (Morishima et al.,
2013).
While rarely reported in the ultimatum game studies,
the time needed by the participants to make a decision
(i.e., response times) may be a good indicator of both the
complexity of the decision and the cognitive processes involved
in the decision-making. Recent studies (e.g., Polezzi et al.,
2008; Fabre et al., 2015) found that responders playing the
ultimatum game were faster answering easily classiﬁable oﬀers,
both fair (i.e., 5€ out of 10€) and unfair (i.e., 1€ out of
10€), than hardly classiﬁable mid-value oﬀers (i.e., 3€ of 10€;
Sanfey et al., 2003). The decision on both unfair and fair
oﬀers appears to rely on fast heuristic-based judgments (i.e.,
refusing unfair oﬀers and accepting fair oﬀers), while deciding
on mid-value oﬀers may be more complex (Sanfey et al.,
2003) and therefore requires a more time consuming and
cognitively costly deliberative reasoning (Civai, 2013; Fabre
et al., 2015). It is plausible that the proposers’ decision-
making works in a similar way. Indeed, when proposers have
social preferences, their decision-making may be relatively fast,
since they would follow social norms and apply the equity
rule (i.e., oﬀering a fair share). In contrast, when proposers
engage in a strategic decision-making, they have to accurately
evaluate all the information available to maximize their gain,
which may be cognitively costly and time consuming. To
this extent, we assume that studying the proposers’ response
times may provide critical information concerning the decision
process and the balance between altruistic and strategic
concerns.
The Impact of Social Information on the
Proposers’ Strategic Concerns
Several studies investigated how proposers modulate their
behavior depending on the responders’ social characteristics
(e.g., Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999). These studies allowed us
to evaluate the proposers’ internal representations of the world.
In other words, how much is a speciﬁc responder “worth” to a
proposer? Eckel and Ball (1996) investigated the eﬀect of social
status information on the proposers’ behavior. In their study,
participants were attributed a star or not depending on their
performance to a trivia quiz before playing the ultimatum game as
either proposer or responder. The priming task (i.e., trivia quiz)
enabled to allocate artiﬁcially a high (i.e., star) or a low status (i.e.,
no star) to the participants. Both high and low status proposers
oﬀered higher shares to high status responders than to low
social status responders, conﬁrming the impact of social status
on economic decision-making (for an overview see Heﬀetz and
Frank, 2008). According to status characteristic theory (Wagner
and Berger, 1993), a status characteristic (i.e., gender, age,
race, physical attractiveness, intelligence or occupation) aﬀects
people’s expectations of reward, and high status individuals
expect to receive higher reward than low status individuals.
To this extent, proposers may adapt their behavior, oﬀering
higher shares to high status responders compared with the
low status responders in order to limit the risk of suﬀering a
rejection (Gürogˇlu et al., 2009). Proposers were also found to
be inﬂuenced by the responders’ attractiveness oﬀering higher
shares to more attractive responders (Solnick and Schweitzer,
1999; Zaatari et al., 2009). Finally, some studies investigated the
impact of the responders’ gender on the proposers’ decision.
Overall, these studies demonstrated that proposers oﬀer more
to male responders than to female responders (e.g., Solnick and
Schweitzer, 1999; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001). Saad
and Gill (2001) found that male proposers were on average more
generous with female thanmale responders, while the responders’
gender did not aﬀect the behavior of female proposers, who
oﬀered equally fair shares to responders of both sexes. A greater
variability in the behavior of male proposers was also found with
altruistic male proposers or aggressive male proposers compared
to female proposers, who showed less variability in their behavior
(Castillo and Cross, 2008).
Because both gender and attractiveness are considered as
status characteristics, the observation of the increased shares
proposed to attractive responders (Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999;
Zaatari et al., 2009) and to male responders in most gender
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studies (e.g., Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999; Eckel and Grossman,
2001; Solnick, 2001) may be interpreted in terms of social status
diﬀerences.
Why Investigate the Impact of Gender
Stereotypes on Economic
Decision-Making?
Conﬂict theories postulate that because men have greater social
status and power (Reskin, 1988), they allocate occupations
that open access to resources (e.g., money, stocks, contacts,
information) predominantly to men, thus favoring themselves
over women, which creates an occupational segregation (Pratto
et al., 1997). For this reason, stereotypically male occupations
(e.g., engineer, electrician) are associated with higher social status
and power compared with those stereotypically female (e.g.,
teacher, beautician; Eagly, 1987; Ridgeway, 2001). Nowadays,
more and more women can enter the professions with a
highly marked male stereotype (e.g., lawyer, banker, doctor), and
more men access to occupations with a highly marked female
stereotype (e.g., nurse, “mid-wife,” teacher; Eagly, 1987; Eagly and
Karau, 2002; Phelan et al., 2008). Given the frequent interactions
of men and women, it is critical to understand how gender
stereotypical beliefs – i.e., a form of social knowledge linked to
actions, attitudes, rules and other forms of knowledge attributed
to individuals based on their biological gender (Greenwald and
Farnham, 2000; Wheeler and Petty, 2001; Quadﬂieg and Macrae,
2011) – modulate economic decision-making.
A recent study investigated how proposers’ gender stereotyped
descriptions (i.e., occupations marked with either a male or a
female stereotype) inﬂuenced the responders’ decision-making
(Fabre et al., 2015). When playing with female-stereotyped
proposers (e.g., linguist), responders were longer to make their
decision, reﬂecting a more deliberative reasoning (Sanfey and
Chang, 2008) associated with an increase in acceptation rates.
In contrast, participants were found to answer more quickly
and to reject more frequently male-stereotyped proposers’ oﬀers
(e.g., economist) than those of female-stereotyped proposers.
That study demonstrated that gender stereotype information of
the proposer modulates the economic decision-making in the
ultimatum game and the cognitive processes underpinning the
decision-making. Therefore, we may reasonably expect gender
stereotypical information of responders to modulate the behavior
of proposers playing the ultimatum game. To our knowledge, this
impact of the responders’ stereotypical identity on the proposers’
decision-making has never been investigated.
The Present Study
In the present behavioral study, we adapted the study of
Fabre et al. (2015) and focused our analyses on the eﬀect of
the gender stereotypical beliefs on the proposers’ economic
strategic behavior. Participants played a repeated one-shot
ultimatum game as proposers against 120 simulated diﬀerent
responders. The latter were introduced to the participants by
occupational nouns stereotypically marked with gender paired
with either feminine or masculine proper names (e.g., linguist-
Anna; economist-David; economist-Cristina; linguist-Leonardo;
Fabre et al., 2015). We assumed that reading occupational role
nouns stereotypically marked with gender leads to automatic
and hard-to-suppress activation of gender stereotypical beliefs
(Banaji and Hardin, 1996; Irmen and Roßberg, 2004; Oakhill
et al., 2005).
We hypothesized that (1) participants would assign a higher
minimum acceptable to both male responders and male-
stereotyped responders (i.e., described with an occupation
stereotypically marked with male gender) – who may be
associated with a higher social status – than to respectively female
responders and female-stereotyped responders (i.e., described
with an occupation stereotypically marked with female gender),
who may in turn be associated with a lower social status (Eckel
and Ball, 1996; Rudman andKilianski, 2000; Ridgeway, 2001).We
also hypothesized that (2) proposers would be faster in making
their oﬀers to both male and male-stereotyped responders
following social norms (i.e., equity rule), while they would take
more time to decide when interacting with respectively female
and female-stereotyped responders following strategic concerns.
According to the Status Incongruity Hypothesis (Rudman et al.,
2012), socially atypical male and female individuals (i.e., not
conformant to gender rules; Eagly and Karau, 2002), are judged
more negatively than socially typical ones, all other things being
equal, and may sometimes undergo penalties (i.e., backlash eﬀect;
Rudman and Glick, 1999; Eagly and Karau, 2002; Rudman and
Fairchild, 2004; Phelan et al., 2008; Rudman et al., 2012). Hence,
we ﬁnally hypothesized that (3) proposers would make higher
oﬀers to responders who conform to gender rules (e.g., linguist-
Cristina, economist-Leonardo), than to responders who violate
gender rules (e.g., linguist-David, economist-Anna).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-four students of Modena University (17 females; age
range 19–26 years M = 21.5, SD = 2.26) were recruited to
play a repeated one-shot ultimatum game as proposer. They
participated for 5% of the total amount of money they won and
were proposed at the end of the experiment to swap this money
for course credits. All were Italian native speakers with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. None of them reported a history of
prior neurological disorder. Participants were informed of their
rights and gave written informed consent for participation in the
study. This study was carried out fulﬁlling ethical requirements
in accordance with the standard procedures of the University of
Modena and Reggio Emilia.
Materials
The same two groups of 30 occupational role nouns each (one
male, one female) with comparable stereotypicality, wealth and
valence, lexical frequency and length used in the study of Fabre
et al. (2015) were used in the present study (see Supplementary
Material). In order to select the experimental materials, a written
questionnaire listing 258 occupational role nouns, ending in
–e,–ista or a consonant to avoid cues to the gender of the
referent in the word form, was presented to 112 students not
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further involved in the experiment (56 females; age range 19–
27 years; Mage = 23.6, SD = 2.92). Eighty of these students
rated to what extent each role noun was stereotypically associated
with male or female individuals on a 7-point Likert scale (i.e.,
stereotype strength; from 1 = only men to 7 = only women),
16 of them to what extent each role noun was associated with a
positive or negative value (i.e., valence: from 1 = very negative
to 7 = very positive) and 16 the wealth of a person described
with each role noun (i.e., wealth: from 1 = very rich to 7 = very
poor). The labels of the scale poles were reversed for half of the
participants. The ﬁnal rating assigned to eachword was calculated
by combining the ratings obtained with both directions of
each rating scale. The 60 role nouns selected as experimental
materials received comparably high ratings of stereotypicality
(the experimental material and the associated ratings are available
in Supplementary Material). In order to compare the stereotype
strength of the two role noun groups, the ratings of the role
nouns ranging from 4 to 7 (i.e., feminine stereotypes) were
translated and ranged from 1 to 4 (i.e., X′ = 8-X, with X:
initial rating and X′: translated rating). Stereotype strength
(Female Stereotypes: M = 2.81, SD = 1.21; Male Stereotypes:
M = 2.77, SD = 1.19), valence (Female Stereotypes: M = 4.42,
SD = 0.69; Male Stereotypes: M = 4.36, SD = 0.71), wealth
(Female Stereotypes: M = 3.81, SD = 0.94; Male Stereotypes
M = 4.10, SD = 0.88), lexical frequency (Female Stereotypes:
M = 5.66, SD= 0.87; Male StereotypesM = 6.09, SD= 1.05) and
length (i.e., number of characters; Female Stereotypes:M = 9.77,
SD = 2.2; Male Stereotypes M = 8.83, SD = 1.82) of male and
female occupational role nouns were comparable (ps > 0.05).
The mean stereotypicality rating of feminine role nouns reported
in the Supplementary Material Table S1 is the translated rating
(i.e., X′).
Experimental materials also included 120 Italian familiar
proper names (60 feminine) without any unisex names. With
the ﬁnal two groups of 30 occupational role nouns along with
the 120 proper names, we created four experimental conditions,
two stereotype-matching conditions: female stereotypical
occupational role nouns followed by feminine proper names (e.g.,
linguista-Anna) and male stereotypical occupational role nouns
followed by masculine proper names (e.g., economista-Davide);
and two stereotype-mismatching conditions: female stereotypical
occupational role nouns followed by masculine proper names
(e.g., linguista-Leonardo) and male stereotypical role nouns
followed by feminine proper names (e.g., economista-Cristina).
Participants interacted once with 30 diﬀerent responders of each
kind (i.e., 120 diﬀerent responders in total).
Procedure
Participants were seated comfortably in a darkened sound-
attenuated room. They played a one-shot ultimatum game as
proposers. An introduction explaining the rules of the ultimatum
game was given to each of them. Stimuli were presented in light
white upper case letters (Courier font, size 13) against a black
background on a high-resolution computer that was positioned at
eye level about 70 cm in front of each participant. A ﬁxation cross
appeared in the middle of a computer screen and remained until
participants pressed a button to start a trial. Each occupational
role noun was displayed for 700 ms followed by a blank screen
for 300 ms. Then a proper name appeared and remained on the
screen until the participants pressed the key on the keyboard
corresponding to the numerical value of the oﬀer they wanted to
make (i.e., from 1€ to 9€ out of 10€). Each response was followed
by a 1000ms blank screen. No feedback on the responder’s answer
was provided to the participants in order to avoid a modulation
of their behavior along the experiment. Participants were asked
to respond as fast as possible.
Before conducting the game, participants were told that they
were playing against 120 real diﬀerent responders of whom
they would know their occupations and proper names. Each
participant was presented with 30 trials in each of the four
experimental conditions for a total of 120 trials. As a matter of
fact, the responder was simulated by the computer. However,
in order to make the participants believe they were playing
against real responders, they were told that responders had been
contacted prior to the game and that they had indicated the oﬀers
they were willing to accept if proposed by a student (i.e., a shifted
in time ultimatum game). Moreover, participants were indicated
that we were thanking the diﬀerent partners involved in this
experiment (e.g., the ﬁreﬁghters of Modena, the Oenology School
of UNIMORE University, etc. . .). Participants were informed
that at the end of the game, responders would receive the sum
corresponding to a percentage of the accepted oﬀers.
Data Analysis
Mean Offers
Mean oﬀers were submitted to a 2 × 2 × 2 (Responders’
Occupation [male-stereotyped, female-stereotyped] ×
Responders’ Gender [male, female] × Participants’ Gender
[male, female]) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Participants’
Gender was a between-subject factor, and the two remaining
factors were within-subject factors.
Response Times
Log transformed mean response times were submitted to
a 2 × 2 × 2 (Responders’ Occupation [male-stereotyped,
female-stereotyped] × Responders’ Gender [male, female] ×
Participants’ Gender [male, female]) ANOVA. Participants’
Gender was a between-subject factor, and the two remaining
factors were within-subject factors.
Questionnaires
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Albiero et al., 2006) was
designed to measure empathy and is composed of four subscales:
(1) the Perspective Taking scale (pt) measuring the tendency to
spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others;
(2) the Empathic Concern scale (ec) assessing “other-oriented”
feelings of sympathy and concern for unfortunate others; (3) the
Personal Distress scale (pd) measuring “self-oriented” feelings
of personal anxiety and unease in tense interpersonal setting;
and (4) the Fantasy scale (f) that taps respondents’ tendencies to
transpose themselves imaginatively into the feelings and actions
of ﬁctitious characters in books, movies, and plays. The Bem
Sex Role Inventory (BSRI; De Leo and Villa, 1986) assesses
the participants’ degree of masculinity/femininity and to what
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extent they embrace traditional sex roles. We examined whether
the scores at the IRI and the BSRI questionnaires predicted
the diﬀerences in mean oﬀer and response time observed for
the diﬀerent responders. To that aim, we conducted Pearson
correlation analyses between the scores of the IRI, the BSRI, and
the resultants of the diﬀerences in mean oﬀer and response times
participants for (1) responders’ occupations marked with male
vs. female stereotypes (i.e., Stereotype [M – F]); and (2) male vs.
female responders (i.e., Gender [M – F]).
Post hoc Rating Study of Social Status
In order to further our argumentation, a ﬁnal rating study was
realized aiming at measuring the social status associated with
the occupational stereotypes used in the present study. Fifty
one participants (24 females; Mage = 31.40, SD = 6.11) were
asked to rate the social status associated with the individuals
practicing each of the 60 occupations used in our experiment
(i.e., from 1 = very low social status to 7 = very high social
status). This study was realized online via Google Forms. In
order to evaluate the impact of the social status associated with
the occupational stereotypes on the proposers’ decision-making
process, we run two one-tailed partial correlations: one between
the occupations stereotypicality (from 1 = very masculine to
7 = very feminine) and the mean oﬀer and one between the
occupations stereotipicality and the response times, each time
controlling for social status. These results were compared to the
results same correlations analysis not controlled for social status.
RESULTS
Mean Offer
On average, participants proposed 3.72€ (SD = 0.17) to the
responders (see Table 1). The ANOVA on mean oﬀers showed
a main eﬀect of stereotype [F(1,32) = 52.53, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.62, see Figure 1]. Participants proposed higher oﬀers to
responders presented with male than with female stereotypical
occupational role nouns (M = 3.94€, SD = 0.11; M = 3.49€,
SD = 0.13; respectively). Participants’ gender [F(1,32) = 0.30,
p = 0.59, η2p = 0.01], responders’ gender [F(1,32) = 0.05,
p = 0.82, η2p = 0.00] main eﬀects and Participants’
Gender × Responders’ Gender [F(1,32) = 1.60, p = 0.22,
η2p = 0.05], Stereotype × Participants’ Gender [F(1,32) = 0.04,
p = 0.84, η2p = 0.00], Stereotype × Responders’ Gender
[F(1,32) = 0.06, p = 0.82, η2p = 0.00], Stereotype × Responders’
Gender × Participants’ Gender [F(1,32) = 1.76, p = 0.19,
η2p = 0.05] interactions were not signiﬁcant.
Response Times
The ANOVA on log-transformed response times showed a
signiﬁcant stereotype main eﬀect [F(1,32) = 43.87, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.58, see Figure 2A] with participants making their
oﬀers faster to male-stereotyped responders than to female-
stereotyped responders (respectively, M = 847 ms, SD = 477;
M = 1142 ms, SD = 706, see Table 1). Participants were
also faster when making their oﬀers to male responders
FIGURE 1 | Mean offers as a function of responders’ gender
stereotypes. Error bars represent standard errors. ∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 2 | (A,B) Response times as a function of (A) responders’ gender
stereotypes and of (B) responders’ genders. Error bars represent standard
errors. ∗p < 0.001.
than to female responders (respectively, M = 893 ms,
SD = 520; M = 1096 ms, SD = 693), as shown by a
signiﬁcant responder’s gender main eﬀect [F(1,32) = 54.95,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.63, see Figure 2B]. The participants’ gender
[F(1,32)= 0.00, p= 0.96, η2p = 0.00] main eﬀect and Participants’
Gender × Responders’ Gender [F(1,32) = 0.04, p = 0.85,
η2p = 0.00], Stereotype × Participants’ Gender [F(1,32) = 0.02,
p = 0.86, η2p = 0.00], Stereotype × Responders’ Gender
[F(1,32) = 2.66, p = 0.11, η2p = 0.08], Stereotype × Responders’
Gender × Participants’ Gender [F(1,32) = 0.25, p = 0.62,
η2p = 0.01] interactions were not signiﬁcant.
Questionnaires
The correlations between the scores obtained by each participant
in the BSRI and in the IRI and the resultants of the various
diﬀerences in mean oﬀer and in response time revealed only one
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signiﬁcant result (see Supplementary Material). The diﬀerence in
response times between responders characterized by a male vs.
female stereotype [Stereotype (M – F)] was positively correlated
to the score of the perceptive taking scale: the higher the score,
the greater the Stereotype (M – F) diﬀerence [r = 0.393, p< 0.05,
see Table 2].
Post hoc Rating Study of Social Status
A dependent t-test analysis was conducted on the social status
ratings revealing that the thirty occupations stereotypically male
were on average associated with a higher social status (M = 4.19,
SD = 0.60) than are the 30 occupations stereotypically female
[M = 3.60, SD= 0.61, t(50) = 10.41, p< 0.001]. The occupations
stereotypicality and the mean oﬀer were signiﬁcantly correlated
(r = −0.396, p < 0.001), however, the signiﬁcance dropped
when controlling for social status (r = −0.225, p < 0.05). The
occupational stereotypicality and the response times were also
found to be signiﬁcantly correlated (r = 0.507, p < 0.001) and
lightly less when controlling for social status (r= 0.492, p< 0.001,
see Supplementary Material).
DISCUSSION
In the present study we investigated whether both the responders’
stereotypical identity and gender modulated the behavior of
proposers playing a repeated one-shot ultimatum game. We
predicted to observe a modulation of both mean oﬀers and
response times depending on the social description of the
responders (i.e., gender and occupational stereotype marked with
gender).
On average, participants proposed 37.2% of the total amount
of money to the responders, which is slightly less than the
average oﬀer, i.e., 40% of the share, reported in the meta-
analysis of Oosterbeek et al. (2004). This diﬀerence is explained
by the fact that while participants oﬀered male-stereotyped
responders a share similar to the one usually proposed in
the ultimatum game (i.e., about 4€ out of 10€; Oosterbeek
et al., 2004), they oﬀered female-stereotyped responders on
average 45 cents less. The results also revealed that the mean
oﬀer was correlated with the degree of stereotypicality of
the responders’ occupations. Indeed, the more masculine the
TABLE 1 | Offers and response times means and standard deviations for each experimental condition.
Female stereotype Male stereotype
Female gender Male gender Female gender Male gender
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Mean offer (€)
Female Participants 3.40 0.72 3.47 0.69 3.87 0.86 3.87 0.86
Male participants 3.58 0.59 3.53 0.55 4.01 0.66 4.01 0.59
Response times (ms)
Female participants 1359 977 1081 770 947 657 792 464
Male participants 1193 494 936 273 884 339 764 343
Italic values are de standard deviations associated with the mean offers and the mean response times.
TABLE 2 | Correlations between the questionnaires’ scores and the differences in mean offers and response times.
Questionnaires Mean offer Response Times
Interpersonal Reactivity Index Bem sex Stereotype
(M – F)
Gender
(M – F)
Stereotype
(M – F)
Gender
(M – F)
Role InventoryPT EC DP F
Questionnaires
IRI (pt) _____
IRI (ec) 0.318 _____
IRI (dp) −0.456∗∗ 0.103 _____
IRI (f) 0.175 0.517∗∗ 105 _____
BSRI −0.140 −0.226 −0.314 −0.429∗ _____
Mean offer
Stereotype (M – F) 0.090 −0.092 −0.090 0.118 0.056 _____
Gender (M – F) −0.033 0.061 0.192 −0.139 −0.135 −0.184 _____
Response times
Stereotype (M – F) 0.393∗ 0.198 −0.090 0.000 −0.042 −0.174 −0.020 _____
Gender (M – F) −0.205 0.033 0.227 −0.096 0.058 −0.194 −0.008 0.340∗ _____
Bold values are statistically significant.
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occupation was, the higher was the oﬀer; and the more feminine
the occupation was, the lower was the oﬀer. These results support
the idea that female-stereotyped responders are associated with
a lower minimum acceptable oﬀer than are male-stereotyped
responders. This diﬀerence in behavior appears to be partly
due to the fact that male-stereotyped occupations are on
average associated with a higher social status compared to male-
stereotyped occupations according to both our post hoc rating
study and literature (Eagly, 1987; Ridgeway, 2001). Participants
were also longer to make their oﬀers to female-stereotyped
responders than to male-stereotyped responders. Again, the
correlation analysis supported the results of the analysis of
variance and showed that response times were correlated with
the stereotypicality of the responders’ occupations. The more
masculine the occupation was, the shorter were the response
times; and the more feminine the occupation was, the longer
were the response times. Taken together, these results suggest
that participants behaved more or less strategically depending
on the responders’ stereotypical identity. When facing male-
stereotyped responders (e.g., economist), proposers followed
social norms, applying the equity rule, oﬀering quickly fair
shares. In contrast, when facing female-stereotyped responders,
proposers adopted a more strategic and cognitively costly
deliberative reasoning, trying to accurately determine their
minimum acceptable oﬀer in order to maximize their gain.
These behaviors were more extreme when the gender stereotype
strength was higher: the more feminine the occupational
stereotype was, the more strategic was the decision; and the more
masculine the occupational stereotype was, the more altruistic
was the decision.
Participants were also found to take more time to make
an oﬀer to female responders than to male responders, to
this extent it may have been more complex for participants
to interact with female responders than with male responders.
However, in contradiction with our predictions, participants
made comparable oﬀers to both female and male responders.
We assume that oﬀering female responders shares equivalent
to those oﬀered to male responders, may have had a cognitive
cost for participants. The increase in response times may reﬂect
a strategic behavior inhibition when interacting with female
responders.
Finally, our predictions concerning the observation of a
backlash eﬀect directed at the responders who violate gender
rules (e.g., economist-Anna; linguist-David) were not fulﬁlled,
since the results revealed no economical penalization toward
these speciﬁc responders. The studies reporting backlash eﬀects
used diverse experimental protocols testing either the ﬁt of hiring
(e.g., Rudman and Glick, 2001; Heilman et al., 2004; Heilman
and Okimoto, 2007; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Rudman et al.,
2012), the selection of a partner game (e.g., Rudman, 1998),
the salary recommendation (e.g., Heilman et al., 2004) or the
opportunity to sabotage a line manager (e.g., Rudman et al.,
2012), to name a few (for a review on backlash eﬀect see
Rudman and Phelan, 2008). In these studies, participants were
given the possibility to commit backlash but were not taking
any risk in doing so. Indeed, the backlashed individuals were
not able to punish the participants in return for their behavior.
We assume that no backlash eﬀect was observed in the present
experiment because participants may have feared to be punished
by the responders, who may have rejected their oﬀer for being
backlashed in the ﬁrst place. A second possibility might be that
participants were simply not willing to backlash mismatching
responders. The present study does not enable to status on the
absence of backlash eﬀect. We plan to address this question in
further studies.
CONCLUSION
The present study continues the long list of works investigating
the impact of social information on economic decision-making.
As far as we know, this study is the ﬁrst to demonstrate
that both men and women modulate their strategic behavior
according the gender-marked stereotype of their counterparts
during economic interactions. Proposers were found to apply
quickly the equity rule when interacting with male-stereotyped
responders, while they behaved more strategically at a greater
cognitive cost with female-stereotyped responders proposing
them lower shares. Proposers were longer to make their oﬀers
to female than to male responders but both kinds of responders
received comparable oﬀers, suggesting a greater cognitive
eﬀort to treat females as equally as males. Taken together,
these results suggest that in real life, individuals practicing
a profession stereotypically female may suﬀer discrimination
during economic interactions, while female individuals may
not, at least when these individuals are given the possibility
to punish in return their counterpart. The present experiment
highlights an evolution of society in that gender discrimination,
which is nowadays strongly decried, may be converting into a
more insidious discrimination toward individuals with female
characteristics. More work is now needed to conﬁrm this
tendency.
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